Tuesday, 30 September 2014
TPP Exposed: WikiLeaks Publishes Secret Trade Text to Rewrite Copyright Laws, Limit Internet Freedom
http://www.democracynow.org - WikiLeaks has published the secret text to part of the biggest U.S. trade deal in history, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). For the past several years, the United States and 12 Pacific Rim nations have been negotiating behind closed doors on the sweeping agreement. A 95-page draft of a TPP chapter released by WikiLeaks on Wednesday details agreements relating to patents, copyright, trademarks and industrial design -- showing their wide-reaching implications for internet services, civil liberties, publishing rights,and medicine accessibility. Critics say the deal could rewrite U.S. laws on intellectual property rights, product safety and environmental regulations, while backers say it will help create jobs and boost the economy. President Obama and U.S. trade representative Michael Froman reportedly wish to finalize the TPP by the end of the year and are pushing Congress to expedite legislation that grants the president something called "fast-track authority." However, this week some 151 House Democrats and 23 Republicans wrote letters to the administration saying they are unwilling to give the president free reign to "diplomatically legislate." We host a debate on the TPP between Bill Watson, a trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.
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Source: YouTube, originally published on Nov 14, 2013
Monday, 29 September 2014
TPP/FastTrack...Hey Media, Where are You?
Mike Papantonio, Ring of Fire Radio joins Thom Hartmann. More and more Americans are waking up to the nightmare that is the Trans - Pacific Partnership - but the mainstream media doesn't seem to care. Do corporate news outlets just not understand trade policy or is their almost total blackout on TPP coverage a sign that they're up to something more sinister?
Source: YouTube, originally published on Feb 7, 2014
Sunday, 28 September 2014
Minister Groser's open letter addressing TPPA concerns
Dear
I write in response to your open letter of 12 May 2014 addressed to the Prime Minister regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations published in the Dominion Post. New Zealand’s goal in TPP remains to reduce the barriers our exporters face and improve their competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Such an outcome will contribute to stronger economic performance in New Zealand that will generate more jobs and higher incomes for New Zealanders. The provisions under discussion are intended to reduce costs for traders, develop more seamless trade and investment networks across the TPP region, further facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in international trade, and promote economic growth and higher living standards. At the same time, negotiators are looking to ensure that the rules agreed in TPP to address regulatory and administrative practices that can act to impede trade and investment do not constrain New Zealand’s ability to regulate for legitimate public policy purposes, including in the health sector. Overall, the potential economic gains from a successfully concluded high quality, comprehensive TPP agreement are substantial.
In your letter you raise concerns about the potential inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in TPP. The Government recognises these concerns and takes them seriously. However, I do not agree with a number of conclusions which you draw.
The first point I would note is that ISDS is not new. Successive New Zealand governments have agreed to reciprocal investment provisions governing the treatment and protection of investors, including ISDS, in international agreements with China and the ASEAN membership. Some of these agreements have been in force for a number of years. The protection that they establish is valued by New Zealanders investing abroad and provide a secure and independent process for the resolution of disputes, particularly in countries where there may be a concern about the fairness or transparency of the legal system.
Secondly, such provisions have only been agreed by New Zealand governments where they have been accompanied by robust safeguards. These include carefully crafted investment obligations, clear exceptions and reservations that protect important areas of regulation such as public health, and procedures that provide for the resolution of disputes which deter frivolous claims and prohibit punitive damages from being awarded.
Thirdly, negotiators in TPP are discussing possible elements that would supplement these safeguards. For example, an important objective for New Zealand and other Parties in TPP is ensuring greater transparency in the administration and operation of ISDS proceedings. Other substantive safeguards are also under discussion.
This carefully calibrated approach to ISDS is further supplemented in our existing treaties by agreement-wide exceptions that make it clear that legitimate government regulation to protect the environment, public health and other public welfare interests are not going to be the subject of successful challenges by foreign investors. These safeguards are also under discussion in TPP. New Zealand views them as a core element to any agreement.
In sum, I will simply not conclude an agreement that opens New Zealand up to successful lawsuits when the government is simply running the country in line with good public policy principles.
Minister Ryall recently wrote about his perspectives as Minister of Health on the TPP negotiations (nzdoctor.co.nz). I would urge practitioners in the New Zealand medical community to read that article closely. It reaffirms the strong health focus we bring to areas like investment, intellectual property and Pharmac issues in the negotiation. The Ministry of Health, a core part of New Zealand’s negotiating team, works closely with my negotiators to ensure our health policy priorities are protected in TPP. On countless occasions, both in New Zealand and abroad, I have said that we will not negotiate on the fundamentals of the public health system, including Pharmac.
I do of course recognise the strong interest that many New Zealanders have in TPP. We continue to strive to strike a balance. New Zealand will not release TPP negotiating documents. That would jeopardise our ability to secure the best deal for New Zealand, as well as breach the understandings on confidentiality which all TPP governments have agreed. But the Government has been active in engaging with a wide spectrum of stakeholders. The consultation processes for TPP are among the most extensive a New Zealand government has ever undertaken for a trade negotiation.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade first sought public comment on TPP in 2008, with a second invitation for submissions and feedback issued in 2011 when Canada, Mexico and Japan expressed interest in joining the negotiation. Negotiators have also met regularly with business groups, local councils, health sector representatives, unions, other NGOs, academics and other individuals to seek input on TPP and to help ensure a high quality outcome to negotiations that advances the national interest. Public and stakeholder interest has also been welcomed via the Ministry’s dedicated TPP portals (tpp@mfat.govt.nz and the ‘TPP Talk’ website).
The process will continue once we reach an agreement. All free trade agreements (FTAs), once signed, must go through the Parliamentary treaty examination process. As part of this process the final text of the agreement is presented to Parliament and referred to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee for examination. During this time, the public will almost certainly be invited to make submissions as part of the consultation process. The Select Committee considers those submissions and reports back to the House. It may at this time make recommendations regarding ratification of the agreement as presented. After that process, any legislative changes required in order to implement the agreement would go through normal Parliamentary procedures which include select committee scrutiny, public submissions and a series of votes in Parliament. Only once any necessary legislation is passed can FTAs like TPP enter into force for New Zealand.
I write in response to your open letter of 12 May 2014 addressed to the Prime Minister regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations published in the Dominion Post. New Zealand’s goal in TPP remains to reduce the barriers our exporters face and improve their competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Such an outcome will contribute to stronger economic performance in New Zealand that will generate more jobs and higher incomes for New Zealanders. The provisions under discussion are intended to reduce costs for traders, develop more seamless trade and investment networks across the TPP region, further facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in international trade, and promote economic growth and higher living standards. At the same time, negotiators are looking to ensure that the rules agreed in TPP to address regulatory and administrative practices that can act to impede trade and investment do not constrain New Zealand’s ability to regulate for legitimate public policy purposes, including in the health sector. Overall, the potential economic gains from a successfully concluded high quality, comprehensive TPP agreement are substantial.
In your letter you raise concerns about the potential inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in TPP. The Government recognises these concerns and takes them seriously. However, I do not agree with a number of conclusions which you draw.
The first point I would note is that ISDS is not new. Successive New Zealand governments have agreed to reciprocal investment provisions governing the treatment and protection of investors, including ISDS, in international agreements with China and the ASEAN membership. Some of these agreements have been in force for a number of years. The protection that they establish is valued by New Zealanders investing abroad and provide a secure and independent process for the resolution of disputes, particularly in countries where there may be a concern about the fairness or transparency of the legal system.
Secondly, such provisions have only been agreed by New Zealand governments where they have been accompanied by robust safeguards. These include carefully crafted investment obligations, clear exceptions and reservations that protect important areas of regulation such as public health, and procedures that provide for the resolution of disputes which deter frivolous claims and prohibit punitive damages from being awarded.
Thirdly, negotiators in TPP are discussing possible elements that would supplement these safeguards. For example, an important objective for New Zealand and other Parties in TPP is ensuring greater transparency in the administration and operation of ISDS proceedings. Other substantive safeguards are also under discussion.
This carefully calibrated approach to ISDS is further supplemented in our existing treaties by agreement-wide exceptions that make it clear that legitimate government regulation to protect the environment, public health and other public welfare interests are not going to be the subject of successful challenges by foreign investors. These safeguards are also under discussion in TPP. New Zealand views them as a core element to any agreement.
In sum, I will simply not conclude an agreement that opens New Zealand up to successful lawsuits when the government is simply running the country in line with good public policy principles.
Minister Ryall recently wrote about his perspectives as Minister of Health on the TPP negotiations (nzdoctor.co.nz). I would urge practitioners in the New Zealand medical community to read that article closely. It reaffirms the strong health focus we bring to areas like investment, intellectual property and Pharmac issues in the negotiation. The Ministry of Health, a core part of New Zealand’s negotiating team, works closely with my negotiators to ensure our health policy priorities are protected in TPP. On countless occasions, both in New Zealand and abroad, I have said that we will not negotiate on the fundamentals of the public health system, including Pharmac.
I do of course recognise the strong interest that many New Zealanders have in TPP. We continue to strive to strike a balance. New Zealand will not release TPP negotiating documents. That would jeopardise our ability to secure the best deal for New Zealand, as well as breach the understandings on confidentiality which all TPP governments have agreed. But the Government has been active in engaging with a wide spectrum of stakeholders. The consultation processes for TPP are among the most extensive a New Zealand government has ever undertaken for a trade negotiation.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade first sought public comment on TPP in 2008, with a second invitation for submissions and feedback issued in 2011 when Canada, Mexico and Japan expressed interest in joining the negotiation. Negotiators have also met regularly with business groups, local councils, health sector representatives, unions, other NGOs, academics and other individuals to seek input on TPP and to help ensure a high quality outcome to negotiations that advances the national interest. Public and stakeholder interest has also been welcomed via the Ministry’s dedicated TPP portals (tpp@mfat.govt.nz and the ‘TPP Talk’ website).
The process will continue once we reach an agreement. All free trade agreements (FTAs), once signed, must go through the Parliamentary treaty examination process. As part of this process the final text of the agreement is presented to Parliament and referred to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee for examination. During this time, the public will almost certainly be invited to make submissions as part of the consultation process. The Select Committee considers those submissions and reports back to the House. It may at this time make recommendations regarding ratification of the agreement as presented. After that process, any legislative changes required in order to implement the agreement would go through normal Parliamentary procedures which include select committee scrutiny, public submissions and a series of votes in Parliament. Only once any necessary legislation is passed can FTAs like TPP enter into force for New Zealand.
I encourage all members of the medical community to visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website (www.mfat.govt.nz/tpptalk) to find out more about the issues under negotiation, including investment, pharmaceuticals and intellectual property.
Yours sincerely
Yours sincerely
Source: mfat.govt.nz
Saturday, 27 September 2014
Chomsky on the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Noam Chomsky discusses the trade deal known as "NAFTA on Steroids", with Laura Flanders at the Left Forum, June 2013. For the full interview: http://blip.tv/grittv/noam-chomsky-on...
Source: YouTube, originally published on Jun 19, 2013
Friday, 26 September 2014
The TPPA: Trading away New Zealand’s independence
One key issue for consideration is the status of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), a comprehensive free trade agreement involving a dozen countries including New Zealand, still in the negotiation phase.
The TPPA would give the world’s most aggressive economy – the United States (U.S.) – access to New Zealand’s markets and to the mechanism of investor/state arbitration against New Zealand, while stripping the New Zealand Parliament of its authority over much of the country’s trade and business.
This paper addresses five systemic aspects of the TPPA:
This paper addresses five systemic aspects of the TPPA:
(1) the asymmetry of the trade relationship between New Zealand and the U.S.;
(2) the secrecy and lack of transparency that permits unequal bargaining positions between producers and consumers throughout the free trade area;
(3) the capture of the entire trading relationship by U.S. special interest groups which instrumentalise the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to sanction and coerce countries into adopting U.S. corporate interests;
(4) the tendency by the U.S. to legislate extra-territorially for other sovereign countries; and
(5) the disparity between the trade negotiation process and New Zealand’s ability to maintain its rule-of-law standard.
Click here to download the PDF version of the paper.
Click here to download the PDF version of the paper.
Source: robertamsterdam.com
Thursday, 25 September 2014
Wikileaks: Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) - IP Chapter
The WikiLeaks release of the text comes ahead of the decisive TPP Chief Negotiators summit in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 19-24 November 2013.
The chapter published by WikiLeaks is perhaps the most controversial chapter of the TPP due to its wide-ranging effects on medicines, publishers, internet services, civil liberties and biological patents.
Significantly, the released text includes the negotiation positions and disagreements between all 12 prospective member states.
Read more at Wikileaks
Source: Wikileaks
Wednesday, 24 September 2014
Why the TPPA makes no sense for NZ
Abstract
The secretive 12 country Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is promoted as an economic integration agreement for the 21st century. Political leaders aim to conclude the deal in November. But whose 21st century does it represent and at what cost? Jane Kelsey explains how the TPPA would prevent us addressing the real challenges of the future, from digital democracy, affordable healthcare and sustainable livelihoods to climate change and financial crises.
Speaker profile
Professor Jane Kelsey is a member of the University of Auckland Faculty of Law, and is one of New Zealand's best-known critical commentators on issues of globalisation, structural adjustment and decolonisation. She hastaught at the University of Auckland since 1979, specialising in socio-legal studies, criminology, policy and international economic regulation. (https://unidirectory.auckland.ac.nz/p...).
Source: YouTube, originally published Aug 17, 2014
Tuesday, 23 September 2014
TPPA - Wikileaks has released another bombshell
Source: YouTube, originally published on Nov 14, 2013
What is the TPPA, and what does it mean for New Zealand?
Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/itsourfutureNZ
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ItsOurFutureNZ
Source: YouTube, originally published Oct 2, 2012
Monday, 22 September 2014
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement research
Background
The TPP has its origins in the 2005 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement amongst Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Currently, the negotiating countries are additionally Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam.
In November 2011, the leaders of the then nine TPP countries announced “the achievement of the broad outlines of an ambitious, 21st-century Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that will enhance trade and investment among the TPP partner countries, promote innovation, economic growth and development, and support the creation and retention of jobs.”
There are several reasons why plurilateral regional agreements, treaties amongst a limited number of countries, are being favoured over multilateral treaties. One is that the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organisation has stalled. Another is America’s Pacific Century which is the geopolitical pivot of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region. A third is the ability to overcome the trade focus of the World Trade Organisation to go ‘beyond the border’ into areas such as investment, competition, regulations, environment, and labour as well as promoting regional economic integration.
Not just a trade agreement
The TPP is often referred to as a trade agreement in New Zealand. In contrast, countries such as the United States consistently refer to it as a partnership amongst countries. Reportedly, “only five of 29 chapters are about what most people recognise as trade negotiations… But this is mainly about domestic laws. It restricts the powers of governments to regulate in ways that might adversely affect the freedoms of foreign companies… It is the rights of government that are up for negotiation.” (emphasis added)
Typical free trade issues included in the TPP include tariffs, rules of origin, phytosanitary standards, and customs. According to the US Trade Representative, the scope of the TPP goes beyond free trade agreements to include Competition, E-Commerce, Environment, Financial Services, Government Procurement, Intellectual Property, Investments, Labour, Legal Issues, and Telecommunications.
Two areas that make the TPP not just another free trade agreement and have attracted significant criticisms are ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) and regulatory coherence.
A leaked negotiation text from June 2012 shows that an investor from any of the TPP countries “will be able to sue the New Zealand government for millions in damages in secretive offshore tribunals. Under ISDS foreign investors could claim that new laws and regulations introduced by the New Zealand government have breached their special rights under the TPP and seriously undermined the value of their investments.”
“…if New Zealand did get sued, then millions of taxpayer dollars would be spent defending the case. [The] average cost of defending an ISDS case is US$8 million, but can easily exceed US$30 million as well as many millions more if we lost… Just the threat of a long, expensive dispute is designed to get governments to back off. If New Zealand signs the TPP we’ll face the prospect of a government scared of making a stand, massive unnecessary spending of tax payer money on law suits, or both.”
“The Australian government refused to include ISDS in its free trade deal with the US in 2005, and it has an investor-state policy not to sign up to any more ISDS obligations including in the TPP.”
An open letter from 100 jurists in TPP countries called on “negotiators to make sure the TPP doesn’t give investors the right to sue governments directly” as it “is not a fair, independent, and balanced method for the resolution of disputes between sovereign nations and private investors.”
Regulatory coherence acts to restrict independence more subtly. The stated aim is “to achieve greater domestic coordination of regulations, increase transparency and stakeholder engagement, and improve competitiveness and the ability of small and medium businesses to engage in international trade.”
In practice, the TPP “aims to frame how governments make their domestic policy and regulatory decisions, alongside more extensive rules that constrain the substance of those decisions. These ‘disciplines’ will, in practice, empower commercial players and advance their interests, and marginalise competing national priorities, advocates and agencies, including democratic political institutions. This additional dimension makes the TPP a threat to national sovereignty over decision making processes and institutions.”
“In controversial areas of policy the TPP could therefore provide multiple opportunities for obstruction and delay, the diversion of resources, and brinkmanship by the affected industry, its commercial and academic allies, and patron states. More extensive substantive rules would reduce governments’ regulatory options. Because criteria like evidence-based decisions and thresholds, such as necessity tests are intrinsically contestable the judgments of policy makers are fertile ground for challenge.”
Secrecy and ratification
All negotiating texts and other materials such as proposals of each Government are in confidence. Unusually, they will be kept as such for four years after the TPP comes into force or is abandoned.
Public discussions have therefore had to rely on leaked texts, for example Wikileaks published the entire Intellectual Property chapter in November 2013 and the Environment Chapter in January 2014. Wikileaks has also published the negotiating position of each country across 14 chapters of the TPP text.
The US Trade Representative has given secret access to the TPP text to 600 corporate trade advisors and pressure group lobbyists while not allowing general access to members of Congress or the public. It is widely believed that such corporate interests play an instrumental role in writing the United States’ negotiating positions and draft TPP text.
Protests against the secrecy of the negotiating process have been a consistent criticism of the TPP, for example by It’s Our Future. Polling shows a large majority of New Zealanders find the secrecy unacceptable.
In New Zealand, the Cabinet has the power to approve the country’s intention to adopt an international treaty such as the TPP. Fifteen days after presenting it to Parliament, the Government can ratify the TPP by executive decision. Regular law making provisions are likely to be used for legislation to implement the provisions of the TPP, including calling for submissions to respective Select Committees.
Unlike New Zealand, in the United States the executive (the President) does not have the power to ratify international treaties. The so-called fast track negotiating authority for trade agreements granted by Congress to the President allows this, with Congress limited to approval or disapproval but not amending it or delaying it beyond 90 days. There are several moves to stop Congress from giving such fast track authority to the President, such as Stop Fast Track.
TPP impact
Based on leaked texts, there has been widespread opposition to most TPP chapters that deal with matters beyond the border. Examples of the impact on New Zealand and restricting the country’s ability to independently make laws and rules include:
Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)
TISA is being described as a new threat being negotiated by governments in secret, particularly to public services.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade describes TISA as an “initiative [that] provides New Zealand with a further opportunity to advance our on-going efforts to lower trade barriers for New Zealand services exporters at the WTO and through free trade agreements. Through the TISA negotiations, New Zealand stands to benefit from the development of new and enhanced rules that promote transparency and services trade, and from securing improved access to TISA markets, which account for approximately 80 per cent of New Zealand’s commercial services exports.”
Negotiations have been going on for over a year but there is limited information available publicly. Given the secretive nature of the negotiations and the intention to bring in “new” and “enhanced” provisions over those in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), there is a degree of suspicion of TISA turning into another TPP. There is also opposition to using the approach of profit maximisation to corporates as the fundamental basis for pushing extreme deregulation and withdrawing oversight.
Source: Internet Party Independence policy
The TPP has its origins in the 2005 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement amongst Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Currently, the negotiating countries are additionally Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam.
In November 2011, the leaders of the then nine TPP countries announced “the achievement of the broad outlines of an ambitious, 21st-century Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that will enhance trade and investment among the TPP partner countries, promote innovation, economic growth and development, and support the creation and retention of jobs.”
There are several reasons why plurilateral regional agreements, treaties amongst a limited number of countries, are being favoured over multilateral treaties. One is that the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organisation has stalled. Another is America’s Pacific Century which is the geopolitical pivot of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region. A third is the ability to overcome the trade focus of the World Trade Organisation to go ‘beyond the border’ into areas such as investment, competition, regulations, environment, and labour as well as promoting regional economic integration.
Not just a trade agreement
The TPP is often referred to as a trade agreement in New Zealand. In contrast, countries such as the United States consistently refer to it as a partnership amongst countries. Reportedly, “only five of 29 chapters are about what most people recognise as trade negotiations… But this is mainly about domestic laws. It restricts the powers of governments to regulate in ways that might adversely affect the freedoms of foreign companies… It is the rights of government that are up for negotiation.” (emphasis added)
Typical free trade issues included in the TPP include tariffs, rules of origin, phytosanitary standards, and customs. According to the US Trade Representative, the scope of the TPP goes beyond free trade agreements to include Competition, E-Commerce, Environment, Financial Services, Government Procurement, Intellectual Property, Investments, Labour, Legal Issues, and Telecommunications.
Two areas that make the TPP not just another free trade agreement and have attracted significant criticisms are ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) and regulatory coherence.
A leaked negotiation text from June 2012 shows that an investor from any of the TPP countries “will be able to sue the New Zealand government for millions in damages in secretive offshore tribunals. Under ISDS foreign investors could claim that new laws and regulations introduced by the New Zealand government have breached their special rights under the TPP and seriously undermined the value of their investments.”
“…if New Zealand did get sued, then millions of taxpayer dollars would be spent defending the case. [The] average cost of defending an ISDS case is US$8 million, but can easily exceed US$30 million as well as many millions more if we lost… Just the threat of a long, expensive dispute is designed to get governments to back off. If New Zealand signs the TPP we’ll face the prospect of a government scared of making a stand, massive unnecessary spending of tax payer money on law suits, or both.”
“The Australian government refused to include ISDS in its free trade deal with the US in 2005, and it has an investor-state policy not to sign up to any more ISDS obligations including in the TPP.”
An open letter from 100 jurists in TPP countries called on “negotiators to make sure the TPP doesn’t give investors the right to sue governments directly” as it “is not a fair, independent, and balanced method for the resolution of disputes between sovereign nations and private investors.”
Regulatory coherence acts to restrict independence more subtly. The stated aim is “to achieve greater domestic coordination of regulations, increase transparency and stakeholder engagement, and improve competitiveness and the ability of small and medium businesses to engage in international trade.”
In practice, the TPP “aims to frame how governments make their domestic policy and regulatory decisions, alongside more extensive rules that constrain the substance of those decisions. These ‘disciplines’ will, in practice, empower commercial players and advance their interests, and marginalise competing national priorities, advocates and agencies, including democratic political institutions. This additional dimension makes the TPP a threat to national sovereignty over decision making processes and institutions.”
“In controversial areas of policy the TPP could therefore provide multiple opportunities for obstruction and delay, the diversion of resources, and brinkmanship by the affected industry, its commercial and academic allies, and patron states. More extensive substantive rules would reduce governments’ regulatory options. Because criteria like evidence-based decisions and thresholds, such as necessity tests are intrinsically contestable the judgments of policy makers are fertile ground for challenge.”
Secrecy and ratification
All negotiating texts and other materials such as proposals of each Government are in confidence. Unusually, they will be kept as such for four years after the TPP comes into force or is abandoned.
Public discussions have therefore had to rely on leaked texts, for example Wikileaks published the entire Intellectual Property chapter in November 2013 and the Environment Chapter in January 2014. Wikileaks has also published the negotiating position of each country across 14 chapters of the TPP text.
The US Trade Representative has given secret access to the TPP text to 600 corporate trade advisors and pressure group lobbyists while not allowing general access to members of Congress or the public. It is widely believed that such corporate interests play an instrumental role in writing the United States’ negotiating positions and draft TPP text.
Protests against the secrecy of the negotiating process have been a consistent criticism of the TPP, for example by It’s Our Future. Polling shows a large majority of New Zealanders find the secrecy unacceptable.
In New Zealand, the Cabinet has the power to approve the country’s intention to adopt an international treaty such as the TPP. Fifteen days after presenting it to Parliament, the Government can ratify the TPP by executive decision. Regular law making provisions are likely to be used for legislation to implement the provisions of the TPP, including calling for submissions to respective Select Committees.
Unlike New Zealand, in the United States the executive (the President) does not have the power to ratify international treaties. The so-called fast track negotiating authority for trade agreements granted by Congress to the President allows this, with Congress limited to approval or disapproval but not amending it or delaying it beyond 90 days. There are several moves to stop Congress from giving such fast track authority to the President, such as Stop Fast Track.
TPP impact
Based on leaked texts, there has been widespread opposition to most TPP chapters that deal with matters beyond the border. Examples of the impact on New Zealand and restricting the country’s ability to independently make laws and rules include:
- Copyright: Extend copyright term by 20 years to life + 70; adopt criminal sanctions; ban parallel importing; stop circumvention of digital locks; restrict fair use; regulate temporary copies.
- Software Patents: Reversing the exclusion of computer software from patentability.
- Medicines: Increase costs and reduce access to affordable medicines by constraining PHARMAC; “Big Pharma” using Investor-state Dispute Settlement processes to block cigarette plain packaging and extending drug monopolies; and undermine public healthcare.
- Financial Services: Restrictions on scope and nature of domestic financial regulation.
- Environment: Too little to offset the harms caused by other chapters with no mandated environmental protections at all.
Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)
TISA is being described as a new threat being negotiated by governments in secret, particularly to public services.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade describes TISA as an “initiative [that] provides New Zealand with a further opportunity to advance our on-going efforts to lower trade barriers for New Zealand services exporters at the WTO and through free trade agreements. Through the TISA negotiations, New Zealand stands to benefit from the development of new and enhanced rules that promote transparency and services trade, and from securing improved access to TISA markets, which account for approximately 80 per cent of New Zealand’s commercial services exports.”
Negotiations have been going on for over a year but there is limited information available publicly. Given the secretive nature of the negotiations and the intention to bring in “new” and “enhanced” provisions over those in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), there is a degree of suspicion of TISA turning into another TPP. There is also opposition to using the approach of profit maximisation to corporates as the fundamental basis for pushing extreme deregulation and withdrawing oversight.
Source: Internet Party Independence policy
Sunday, 21 September 2014
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) problems
In an increasingly interconnected world, regional pacts to promote greater economic integration could be a positive but only if it is forged in New Zealand’s interests.
The TPPA will not be just another free trade agreement. Only five of the 29 TPPA chapters deal with traditional free trade issues such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers. It will reach far ‘beyond the border’ into areas such as investment, competition, regulations, environment, and labour.
All negotiating texts and other materials such as proposals of each Government are secret. Public discussions have had to rely on leaked texts while select corporate stakeholders, particularly in the US, not only have confidential access but also are playing an active role in creating the proposed text of the agreement.
Expert analysis of leaked negotiating texts of chapters dealing with ‘beyond the border’ areas have shown the potential for deep negative impacts on New Zealand and others.
Negotiating 'beyond the border' type issues in secret is justified by governments as standard practice for free trade agreements. However, these issues are far beyond typical areas included in free trade agreements. The right standard for judging the TPPA secrecy is open discussions held in multilateral fora like the World Trade Organisation and the World Intellectual Property Office.
The TPPA has become a tool for a country's corporate interests to negotiate with foreign governments. While free trade agreements were primarily government-to-government negotiations with balanced commercial and public policy interests, the TPPA represents narrow corporate profit maximisation objectives taking on 'partner' governments by constraining their future domestic law-making abilities. This represents an unprecedented challenge to sovereignty and independence.
One particular concern is the proposed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions which will enable overseas corporates to sue the New Zealand government for millions in damages in secretive offshore tribunals. Under ISDS, foreign investors could claim that new laws and regulations introduced by the New Zealand government have breached their special rights under the TPPA and seriously undermined the value of their investments.
There is no evidence that ISDS is actually required to increase investment or that it even works to do so.
Another area of concern from the perspective of New Zealand's independence is 'regulatory coherence'. The stated aim is to achieve greater domestic coordination of regulations and increase transparency within economically integrated countries or regions.
However, in combination with other TPPA provisions, regulatory coherence has been subverted by narrow corporate interests to advance their interests while neutering competing national priorities and democratic political institutions.
None of the lessons and shortcomings of the TPPA are being recognised or accepted. Even the potential gains from the TPPA are increasingly becoming illusionary, for example increased access for New Zealand's agricultural produce are being threatened by bilateral US-Japan negotiations.
There is a danger that the nascent TISA (Trade in Services Agreement) will turn into another TPPA.
Source: Internet Party Independence policy
The TPPA will not be just another free trade agreement. Only five of the 29 TPPA chapters deal with traditional free trade issues such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers. It will reach far ‘beyond the border’ into areas such as investment, competition, regulations, environment, and labour.
All negotiating texts and other materials such as proposals of each Government are secret. Public discussions have had to rely on leaked texts while select corporate stakeholders, particularly in the US, not only have confidential access but also are playing an active role in creating the proposed text of the agreement.
Expert analysis of leaked negotiating texts of chapters dealing with ‘beyond the border’ areas have shown the potential for deep negative impacts on New Zealand and others.
Negotiating 'beyond the border' type issues in secret is justified by governments as standard practice for free trade agreements. However, these issues are far beyond typical areas included in free trade agreements. The right standard for judging the TPPA secrecy is open discussions held in multilateral fora like the World Trade Organisation and the World Intellectual Property Office.
The TPPA has become a tool for a country's corporate interests to negotiate with foreign governments. While free trade agreements were primarily government-to-government negotiations with balanced commercial and public policy interests, the TPPA represents narrow corporate profit maximisation objectives taking on 'partner' governments by constraining their future domestic law-making abilities. This represents an unprecedented challenge to sovereignty and independence.
One particular concern is the proposed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions which will enable overseas corporates to sue the New Zealand government for millions in damages in secretive offshore tribunals. Under ISDS, foreign investors could claim that new laws and regulations introduced by the New Zealand government have breached their special rights under the TPPA and seriously undermined the value of their investments.
There is no evidence that ISDS is actually required to increase investment or that it even works to do so.
Another area of concern from the perspective of New Zealand's independence is 'regulatory coherence'. The stated aim is to achieve greater domestic coordination of regulations and increase transparency within economically integrated countries or regions.
However, in combination with other TPPA provisions, regulatory coherence has been subverted by narrow corporate interests to advance their interests while neutering competing national priorities and democratic political institutions.
None of the lessons and shortcomings of the TPPA are being recognised or accepted. Even the potential gains from the TPPA are increasingly becoming illusionary, for example increased access for New Zealand's agricultural produce are being threatened by bilateral US-Japan negotiations.
There is a danger that the nascent TISA (Trade in Services Agreement) will turn into another TPPA.
Source: Internet Party Independence policy
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